Attitudes of the magistrates on the judicial system reforms in Bulgaria

May-June 2016
About the survey

The research „Attitudes of the magistrates on the judicial system reforms in Bulgaria” was carried out with the financial support of the “America for Bulgaria” Foundation within the framework of the “Transparent Judicial Appointments Initiative”.

The research was carried out by Global Metrics social and market research agency between May and June 2016 upon request of the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives among 606 magistrates from the whole country. They have replied to questions related to the reforms in the Bulgarian courts and prosecutions. The interviewees have shared their opinions on the pending changes and amendments in the Judicial System Act.
The study “Attitudes of the magistrates on the judicial system reforms in Bulgaria” was carried out with the financial support of the “America for Bulgaria” Foundation within the framework of the “Transparent Judicial Appointments Initiative”. The study represents solely the opinions and conclusions of its authors and in no way engages the funding organization.
Evaluation about the reforms and key problems in the judicial system
Evaluation of the judicial system reforms in the last two years

The judicial system is changing for the better and the changes are significant: 7.9% of prosecutors and 8.6% of judges.

Some petty things are changing for the better, but significant reforms are still lacking: 70.8% of prosecutors and 67.6% of judges.

Some elements in the judicial system are worsening, although this is not leading to big negative results: 9.0% of prosecutors and 11.9% of judges.

Severe worsening of the situation is observed: 12.4% of prosecutors and 11.9% of judges.
### Main difficulties and problems in the judicial system of Bulgaria (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Judges</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much media pressure on certain cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much caseload in some regions and bad HR organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of clear and transparent mechanisms for career advancement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low level of trust in the work of the judicial system</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal evaluation, which does not create a motivation for a qualitative performance and does not identify weaknesses and gaps in the performance of any given magistrate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bar chart showing the percentage of judges and prosecutors who agree with each issue.
Main difficulties and problems in the judicial system of Bulgaria (2)

- Political influence and pressure related to the appointment of heads of courts and prosecutions coming from representatives of the executive power: 49.2% (Judges) vs 29.2% (Prosecutors)
- Low quality legislative process and changes made too often thus creating normative problems: 52.8% (Judges) vs 48.6% (Prosecutors)
- Too much political influence coming from the executive and the political circles through the parliamentary quota of the SJC: 38.4% (Judges) vs 25.8% (Prosecutors)
- Too formalized procedures: 36.2% (Judges) vs 36.2% (Prosecutors)
- Political influence and pressure related to the outcome of certain cases and checkups, coming from representatives of the executive power: 30.3% (Judges) vs 35.1% (Prosecutors)
Main difficulties and problems in the judicial system of Bulgaria (3)

- Lack of motivation among most magistrates
  - Judges: 34.1%
  - Prosecutors: 27.0%

- Use of the disciplinary punishments as a way of intentional punishment of a concrete magistrate and not as a way of improving the judicial process
  - Judges: 34.1%
  - Prosecutors: 20.2%

- Low remuneration
  - Judges: 29.2%
  - Prosecutors: 23.6%

- Lack of feeling of a common mission and playing a key role in the fight against criminality, as well as the establishment of a new law order
  - Judges: 27.6%
  - Prosecutors: 32.6%

- Lack of adequate expert witness reports
  - Judges: 23.8%
  - Prosecutors: 23.6%
Main difficulties and problems in the judicial system of Bulgaria (4)

- There are too many factors limiting the inner conviction and the independence of the magistrates
- Lack of opportunities for specialization and training
- Corruption and power abuse at various levels of the judicial system
- Administrative vertical pressure within the separate structures of the system and related to the outcome of particular cases
- Bad facilities, lack of working space or spaces with bad or improper labour conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Judges</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad facilities, lack of working space or spaces with bad or improper labour conditions</td>
<td>18,9</td>
<td>16,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and power abuse at various levels of the judicial system</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>15,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative vertical pressure within the separate structures</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>14,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the system and related to the outcome of particular cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of opportunities for specialization and training</td>
<td>13,0</td>
<td>12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many factors limiting the inner conviction and the</td>
<td>10,3</td>
<td>19,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence of the magistrates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Numbers of problems pointed by magistrates

- Between 1 and 3 problems: 12.06%
- From 4 to 6 problems: 35.11%
- From 7 to 9 problems: 29.43%
- More than 9 problems: 23.40%
In your opinion, how true is the statement that only the people with the best professional and moral qualities are advancing in the hierarchy?

- 4.5% I fully agree
- 22.7% I rather agree
- 52.3% I rather don't agree
- 44.6% I don't agree at all

Prosecutors and Judges
In your opinion, does a different treatment exist when disciplinary punishments are applied, i.e. in some cases people get punished for the same violations and in other cases - no?

Prosecutors

Judges

- Yes: 13.5%, 25.8%
- Rather yes: 46.1%, 46.7%
- Rather no: 32.6%, 26.4%
- No: 7.9%, 1.1%
In the process of cases/court files distribution, have you heard of cases where the RCA principle is not applied or the system is intentionally manipulated?

- Yes, I have heard of such cases: 9.1% Prosecutors, 11.0% Judges
- I have heard of such cases, but not in our court/prosecution: 27.3% Prosecutors, 37.6% Judges
- No, I don’t know about such cases: 63.6% Prosecutors, 51.4% Judges
Have you heard of cases where magistrates have received oral instructions from magistrates from a higher instance on what the outcome on certain cases should be?

![Graph showing responses to the question]

- **Prosecutors**
  - Yes, often: 5.6%
  - Yes, occasionally: 34.8%
  - No: 59.6%

- **Judges**
  - Yes, often: 3.8%
  - Yes, occasionally: 29.9%
  - No: 66.3%
In your opinion, does the performance evaluation provide an objective and fair evaluation of the work of the magistrates?

Prosecutors

- Yes: 2,2%
- Rather yes: 24,7%
- Rather no: 59,6%
- No: 13,5%

Judges

- Yes: 2,7%
- Rather yes: 31,9%
- Rather no: 44,0%
- No: 21,4%
Do you personally feel correctly and adequately evaluated?

- Yes: 19.3% (Prosecutors), 19.6% (Judges)
- Rather yes: 42.0% (Prosecutors), 45.8% (Judges)
- Rather no: 28.4% (Prosecutors), 26.3% (Judges)
- No: 10.2% (Prosecutors), 8.4% (Judges)
How do you evaluate the work of the Inspectorate to the SJC (ISJC) so far?

More than one answer was possible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Judges</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It creates additional prerequisites for pressure over the judicial system</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It functions selectively, in most cases as an instrument for mob law</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It creates guarantees for finding irregularities and “cleaning” the judicial system</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It creates guarantees for finding irregularities and “cleaning” the judicial system

<table>
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It functions selectively, in most cases as an instrument for mob law

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<td>44.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
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It creates additional prerequisites for pressure over the judicial system

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How do you evaluate so far the work of the SJC Ethics Committee?

- **It functions selectively, in most cases as an instrument for mob law**: 49.2% Judges, 29.2% Prosecutors.
- **It creates additional prerequisites for pressure over the judicial system**: 40.5% Judges, 28.1% Prosecutors.
- **It creates guarantees for finding irregularities and “cleaning” the judicial system**: 18.9% Judges, 38.2% Prosecutors.
- **Other, please specify**: 4.3% Judges, 6.7% Prosecutors.
Gap between key factors of environment to the extent to which they are important and the level to which they are existent or developed enough within the Bulgarian judicial system (1)

- The possibility that only people with professional and ethical qualities are taking the leadership positions
- Objective and fair mechanisms for imposing disciplinary sanctions which guarantee equal treatment of the individual magistrates
- Real guarantees for my independence as a magistrate
- Remuneration which corresponds to the work load and the nature of the work
- Good partnership and cooperation among the colleagues and the separate structures, a feeling of being part of a team
- Even case load and taking into account the number of cases together with their factual and legal complexity
- Opportunities for personal and professional improvement and development
- Fair and objective evaluation
- All should adhere to the rules of professional conduct and ethics

Prosecutors-existence  Judges-existence  Prosecutors-importance  Judges-importance
Gap between key factors of environment to the extend to which they are important and the level to which they are existent or developed enough within the Bulgarian judicial system (2)

The feeling for a common mission and values with the other magistrates and the common sense about the leading role in ensuring legal order

Encouragement of the common feeling of responsibility of every separate magistrate

Existence of professional ethics in the whole system, a possibility for the system to "clean itself" from unethical and unmoral magistrates

Calm work with less stress and pressure

Clear and fair mechanisms for promotion

A feeling of clear and transparent mechanisms for selection and appointment of magistrates

Clear and objective criteria for career advancement which take under consideration the professional and managerial qualities of the candidates

Increasing trust in the institutions of the judicial power

Good public image and social status of the magistrates
Are the competitions carried out based on clear and objective criteria—only answers «YES» are presented.

- Competitions for initial entry in the system: 33.7% (Prosecutors), 31.9% (Judges)
- Competitions for heads of courts/prosecutions: 22.5% (Prosecutors), 19.5% (Judges)
- Competitions for career advancement: 24.7% (Prosecutors), 19.5% (Judges)
The candidates chosen are in fact the best prepared and the most appropriate for the respective position - only answers «YES» are presented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitions</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitions for initial entry in the system</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitions for heads of courts/prosecutions</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitions for career advancement</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FACTORS FOR RESTRICTING THE PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF BULGARIAN MAGISTRATE level of influence where 1 is “very weak influence” and 10 – “very strong influence” (1)

- "Closing the eyes" in cases of incompetent and low quality work
  - Judges: 6.59
  - Prosecutors: 7.39

- Putting a stress on formal criteria and not on personal initiative and professionalism – when evaluating the quality of the work of magistrates
  - Judges: 6.99
  - Prosecutors: 6.49

- Influence over separate representatives of the judicial system coming from political circles
  - Judges: 6.93
  - Prosecutors: 6.58

- Media pressure
  - Judges: 6.81
  - Prosecutors: 6.98

- Lack of public support und understanding of the role of the magistrate
  - Judges: 6.77
  - Prosecutors: 6.44

- Lack of effective protection in cases of threat on the security of a magistrate and/or his family and relatives
  - Judges: 6.69
  - Prosecutors: 6.57

- Heavy caseload
  - Judges: 6.36
  - Prosecutors: 6.44

- Lack of reflex for a common reaction in cases of pressure over colleagues
  - Judges: 6.34
  - Prosecutors: 6.34
### Factors for Restricting the Professional Independence of Bulgarian Magistrate

The level of influence is measured on a scale from 1 (very weak influence) to 10 (very strong influence).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Judges</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possibilities for economical and other pressure over family</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or family of a magistrate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of transparent disciplinary process and unequal treatment on</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>similar cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of transparent evaluation and career advancement processes which</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puts a magistrate in a position where he/she is depending on the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discretion of Heads of courts/prosecutions and SJC members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so good remuneration and economical vulnerability</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>6.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too strong hierarchical dependence</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of incentives for a quality performance</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical pressure coming from interested parties</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibilities for informal hierarchical influence on concrete cases</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>court files</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2)
Difference in the opinion of judges and prosecutors about the role of the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of the European Commission in achieving reforms in the prosecution and the judicial power?

- **Positive, the CVM of the EC has to continue**: 51.9% (Judges) - 27.0% (Prosecutors)
- **It does not have a substantial role, it is better that the CVM gets terminated**: 55.1% (Judges) - 28.1% (Prosecutors)
- **I can’t assess**: 20.0% (Judges) - 18.0% (Prosecutors)
Divided positions of the magistrates about whether the judicial reform strategy has clear measures and priorities and if that will lead to an improvement of the performance of the judicial system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Prosecutors Col %</th>
<th>Judges Col %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I like my work as magistrate, but not the way the Bulgarian judicial system operates</td>
<td>77,5%</td>
<td>73,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the current Strategy for judicial reform gets implemented, that will lead to an improvement of the performance of the judicial system</td>
<td>44,9%</td>
<td>56,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People elected on the leadership positions in the judiciary are such with vision and professional and moral qualities</td>
<td>46,1%</td>
<td>29,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judicial system has an overall strategy for reform with clear measures and priorities</td>
<td>21,3%</td>
<td>22,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judicial system in Bulgaria works well and does not need reforms</td>
<td>15,7%</td>
<td>9,2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participation of the magistrates with proposals on key legislative issues
Up to now, have you personally had opportunities to make proposals for legislative changes in the substantive and procedural laws?

- **Yes, personally**: 16.9%
- **Yes, through the Head of my court/prosecution**: 31.5%
- **No**: 57.4%

- **Prosecutors**: 51.7%
- **Judges**: 57.4%
Were these proposals taken under consideration during the drafting of the law?

- Yes: 2.3%
- Partially: 25.6%
- No: 72.1%

Prosecutors: 45.5%
Judges: 45.5%
How should the voting on important issues for the judicial system, which includes voting of the GAs of judges/prosecutors, be performed?

- Nationwide voting of all judges/prosecutors: 64.0% (Prosecutors) vs. 69.7% (Judges)
- Voting through delegates elected on the basis of territory and instance: 36.0% (Prosecutors) vs. 30.3% (Judges)
How should the voting on other issues important for the judicial system, which includes voting of the GAs of judges/prosecutors at the respective courts/prosecutions, be performed?

How should the voting for members of the SJC from the professional quota be performed?

On paper
- Prosecutors: 50.0%
- Judge: 39.4%

Electronically
- Prosecutors: 50.0%
- Judge: 60.6%
In your opinion, should magistrates come up with an unified position on current issues related to the judicial system?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely yes</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather yes</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather no</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Opinion on the proposals for legislative changes
Do you think that violation of the Code of Ethics of the magistrates shall not be treated as a ground for disciplining a magistrate?

- Yes: 15.7% (Prosecutors) 11.5% (Judges)
- Rather yes: 16.9% (Prosecutors) 19.2% (Judges)
- Rather no: 56.2% (Prosecutors) 48.4% (Judges)
- No: 11.2% (Prosecutors) 20.9% (Judges)
How should disciplinary procedures be processed?

Through the establishment of a permanent disciplinary commission comprised of seconded magistrates
- Judges: 47.6%
- Prosecutors: 42.7%

By court panels which should suggest a punishment to the SJC when they find that a violation was performed
- Judges: 47.0%
- Prosecutors: 53.9%

No answer
- Judges: 5.4%
- Prosecutors: 3.4%
What do you think about the new functions of the ISJC*

- They will guarantee more independence of the judicial system
  - Judges: 13,0%
  - Prosecutors: 13,5%

- They will create prerequisite for cleaning the system
  - Judges: 21,6%
  - Prosecutors: 31,5%

- They will create prerequisites for bigger dependence of the judicial system
  - Judges: 41,6%
  - Prosecutors: 41,6%

- They will create additional prerequisites for pressure over the judicial system
  - Judges: 53,0%
  - Prosecutors: 41,6%

Other
- Judges: 3,2%
- Prosecutors: 1,1%

*to perform checkups on integrity and conflict of interests of judges, prosecutors and investigators, to check their property declarations, as well as to find actions which damage the prestige of the judicial system and actions related to infringing the independence of judges, prosecutors and investigators
How do you feel about the ISJC doing checkups on enforced court acts (checking the quality of the arguments)?

- **Completely approve**
  - Prosecutors: 9.0%
  - Judges: 2.7%

- **Rather approve**
  - Prosecutors: 7.9%
  - Judges: 6.5%

- **Rather don’t approve**
  - Prosecutors: 39.3%
  - Judges: 21.1%

- **Completely disapprove**
  - Prosecutors: 43.8%
  - Judges: 69.7%
How do you feel about ISJC doing checkups on audio recordings of court hearings (proper and ethical behavior, professional qualities, etc. of magistrates)?

- Completely approve: 9.0%
- Rather approve: 34.6%
- Rather don’t approve: 47.2%
- Completely disapprove: 29.7%

Prosecutors

Judges
What changes are needed, in your opinion, in order to guarantee that when evaluating magistrates the stress will be put more on the quality of the work than on formal and quantitative indicators?

- **Change in the evaluation methodology**: 73.0% judges, 56.2% prosecutors
- **Establishing a centralized unified evaluation commission which shall guarantee in depth evaluations and an unified standard**: 54.6% judges, 47.2% prosecutors
- **Increase and provide regulation for evaluation performed by the Head of the respective court/prosecution who knows the magistrates’ performance best**: 30.3% judges, 37.1% prosecutors
- **Increase the rights of the ISJC**: 5.4% judges, 5.6% prosecutors
- **Other**: 4.3% judges, 3.4% prosecutors
How should the competitions for transfer and promotion of magistrates be carried out?

Based on documents only
- Prosecutors: 34.1%
- Judges: 44.1%

Documents plus interview
- Prosecutors: 65.9%
- Judges: 55.9%
How should the competitions for transfer and promotion of magistrates be carried out?

- A competition for each vacancy within a concrete court and prosecution should be announced: 40.4% of prosecutors, 47.6% of judges.
- Through a centralized competition for all courts and prosecutions from the respective level: 43.8% of prosecutors, 34.6% of judges.
- There should be more than one rating when carrying out the competitions: 37.1% of prosecutors, 36.2% of judges.
Evaluation of different proposals for changes (only answers “will have a positive effect” are presented) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by GA of all judges/prosecutors of members of the SJC from the professional quota by guaranteed anonymity of the vote</td>
<td>78,2%</td>
<td>79,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More professional discussions among magistrates on key issues related to the substantive and procedural law, and the legislative changes under consideration</td>
<td>75,0%</td>
<td>78,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring of the prosecution in order to decrease the overwhelming centralization</td>
<td>60,9%</td>
<td>77,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminating the parliamentary quota at the SJC and establishing a SJC from a professional quota only</td>
<td>68,2%</td>
<td>75,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing the numbers of members from the parliamentary quota in the SJC</td>
<td>75,6%</td>
<td>73,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a mechanism to hold the Prosecutor General accountable</td>
<td>33,3%</td>
<td>67,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the authorities of the GA of magistrates when nominating and/or electing heads/deputy heads and heads of departments</td>
<td>56,3%</td>
<td>67,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the criteria and mechanisms for determining disciplinary violations, as well as the procedures for imposing disciplinary punishments</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election of the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court by all judges</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by the plenums of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court of the members of the commissions responsible for the competitions for transfer and promotion of judges</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More professional discussions among magistrates on key issues related to the reform in the judicial system</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More active participation of the General assemblies (GA) of the judges and prosecutors in the management process of the courts and prosecutions</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of more magistrates in the work of the SJC through the establishment of commissions comprised of seconded magistrates</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by the GA of judges and prosecutors of the members of commissions responsible for the competitions for transfer and promotion</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
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## Evaluation of different proposals for changes (only answers “will have a positive effect” are presented) (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Prosecutors</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring of first instance courts and prosecutions in order to optimize case load</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the mechanisms for quality control of the work</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election of the Prosecutor General by all prosecutors</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by the plenums of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court of the members of the Judges evaluation commission at the SJC</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricting the practice of seconding magistrates in a upper instance</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by the GA of the SCP, SAP and the NIS of the members of the commissions responsible for the competitions for transfer and promotion of prosecutors</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election by the GA of the Supreme Cassation Prosecution, Supreme Administrative Prosecution and the National Investigative Service of the members of the Evaluation commission for prosecutors and investigators at the SJC</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortening the duration of the mandates of the “three big” (Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General)</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prosecutor General shall account to the National Assembly</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparisons of the opinion of the prosecutors between 2014-2016
The prosecution is changing for the better and the changes are significant. Some petty things are changing for the better, but significant reforms are still lacking. Some elements in the prosecution's activities are worsening, although this is not leading to big negative results. Severe worsening of the situation is observed. No answer.
In your opinion, how true is the statement that only the people with the best professional and moral qualities are advancing in the hierarchy?

Prosecutors 2014
Prosecutors 2016

- I fully agree
- I rather agree
- I rather don't agree
- I don't agree at all

3,7% 4,5% 20,2% 22,7% 38,5% 52,3% 36,7% 20,5%
What, in your opinion, is the role of the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of the European Commission in achieving reforms in the prosecution and the judicial power?

Positive, the CVM of the EC has to continue: 49.1% (2014), 55.1% (2016)

It does not have a substantial role, it is better that the CVM gets terminated: 27.0% (2014), 20.8% (2016)

I can’t assess: 30.2% (2014), 18.0% (2016)
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