In some states voters participate in some form in judicial appointments. Direct voting is a classic form. However, elections mean competition, and competition means campaign. The first problem is that voters do not possess the necessary knowledge to evaluate the legal competence and suitability of candidates for the judicial profession. That is why often campaigns get political flavor and those who win are usually skilled politicians, but not necessarily good judges. Campaigns, on the other hand, need funding. Most motivated to fund judicial campaigns are groups of people who are interested in the work of judges – law firms, lobbyists, etc. The problem may arise while a judge trying cases should not consider how his actions may influence his popularity and the benevolence of his sponsors at the end of his mandate and during his retention campaign.
The author states that there are efficient tools for public participation in the judiciary – its budget, adopted by the Parliament, the majority in the Supreme Judicial Council, elected by the Parliament, and lay judges on criminal cases, elected by municipality councils. He argues that these three forms could be sufficient if rationalized in favor of public interest. That is way no change of judiciary model is necessary, only minor legislative amendments and steady public pressure.